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I.

Introduction

Likely the most comprehensive review of Canadian law on

contracting with minors was published in 1975,' when its author,
David R. Percy, lamented that "the present state of the law is

* Bob Tarantino, LL.B, LL.M (Osgoode Hall) is a lawyer in the Entertainment Law
Group of Heenan Blaikie LLP and is a member of the Bars of the Province of Ontario and
the State of New York.
1. David R. Percy, The Present Law of Infants' Contracts,53 Can. Bar. Rev. 1,1 (1975).
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somewhat confused";2 thirty years later we are unfortunately unable
to substantially revise that assessment. The uncertainty that
surrounds contracting with minors impacts numerous activities, but
has particular significance for the film and television industries.
Reported cases in Canada dealing with minors' contracts are
relatively sparse. This may be a function of the relative value of
contracts entered into with minors compared to the cost of seeking
relief in the courts in the event of a dispute. That is, it is unlikely that
most business transactions involving a minor would concern sums
large enough to warrant the expenditure of legal action. In film and
television production, the child performer's contract may itself be for
a relatively small amount of remuneration - however, the potential
losses to a producer who is unable to bind a child performer could be
enormous: the entire production may be rendered unexploitable if,
for example, the minor played a leading role.
Producers seek two separate sets of rights. First, the producer
wants the right to engage the performer to render their service at a
particular time and place (i.e., the ability to engage the actor to
perform). Second, producers seek the right to exploit the results and
proceeds of the performer's services after the rendering of services
(i.e., the ability to make use of the image and/or voice of the
performer in various media). The former matter is properly the
subject of labor law, while the latter will often be governed by the
terms and conditions of the contract entered into by the producer and
performer. This becomes particularly acute in the case of minors,
whom the common law has traditionally empowered with the ability
to disaffirm or render void a contract into which they previously
entered, prior to or within a short period of time after achieving the
age of majority.
The "disaster" scenario for a producer would involve a minor
who plays a significant role in a film attempting to disaffirm the
contract. If successful, such effort would result in the producer being
unable to exploit the production at all because the terms which
granted the producer the right to make use of the image or voice of
the minor would be void. Depending on when the disaffirmance
occurred, it could prevent the initial theatrical release or broadcast of
the production, or the exploitation of ancillary or subsidiary rightsin either case, a potentially catastrophic financial hit.
In a number of the most important film and television production
centers (as measured by volume of production), the concerns
2.

Id. at 2.
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surrounding the enforcement of a contract with a minor have been
addressed by legislative enactments specifically targeted at the
entertainment industry. This article seeks to give producers and
production counsel (both American and Canadian) sufficient
information on the state of contract law and legislative initiatives in
the more prominent North American jurisdictions in which film and
television production occurs to enable them to make informed
decisions about what steps need to be taken to protect their interests
when contracting with performers who are under the age of majority.
Employment law regulations are beyond the scope of this paper and
are only addressed to the extent they affect the contractual analysis.
II. United States
Generally speaking, United States common law provides that a
minor does not possess capacity to enter into binding contracts.3 The
rigor with which this doctrine is applied varies from state to state and
from situation to situation, giving rise to a confusing patchwork of
case law which is hostile to the certainty sought by film and television
producers, financiers and distributors. In California and New York,
the two states hosting the largest domestic production industries,
legislative action was taken in order to ensure that minors could be
held to the terms of contracts into which they entered. The following
is a brief summation of the legal regimes in place in both jurisdictions.
A.

California

The California Civil Code initially reflects the general common
law position by providing that "all persons are capable of contracting,
except minors, persons of unsound mind, and persons deprived of
civil rights, 4 and then modifies this by providing a comprehensive
regime for addressing the manner in which minors rendering services
in the entertainment industry are able to enter into binding contracts
The California Family Code provides that minors "may make a
contract in the same manner as an adult" subject to (a) the power of
the minor to disaffirm the contract, and (b) certain substantive
restrictions on the subject-matter of the contract.6 The minor's right

3. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts §14 (1981).
4. CAL. CIV. CODE, § 1556 (1872).
5. See CAL. CIV. CODE, § 1157(a): "The capacity of a minor to contract is governed
by Division 11 (commencing with Section 6500) of the Family Code."
6. CAL. FAM. CODE § 6700 (1992). See also CAL. FAM. CODE § 6701, which
provides that a minor is incapable of (a) giving a delegation of power, (b) contracting with
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of disaffirmance is codified, subject to the other provisions of the
Family Code.7 Again reflecting the common law position, the right of
disaffirmance for unemancipated minors does not extend to contracts
for necessaries.'
The general power of a minor to disaffirm a contract entered into
either before majority or within a reasonable period of time
thereafter is circumscribed where the contract is for services rendered
in the entertainment industry, 9 and the contract has been approved by
a court." California Family Code §6750 provides that the
entertainment-contracting provisions apply to contracts entered into
after January 1, 2000 for the "artistic or creative services" of a minor,
the licensing of artistic properties, personality rights and depiction
rights, and "services as a participant or player in a sport."... "Artistic
or creative services" is defined expansively, and includes services as
an actor, dancer, comedian, writer, composer or musician. 2
The judicial approval mechanism is described in detail in the
legislation, including the stipulation of venue, 3 parties to the
proceeding (being the parties to the contract, i.e., the employer and
the guardian ad litem of the minor - stipulated as the parent or legal
guardian of the minor unless otherwise determined by the court)"4 and
service of process." Either party may commence the approval
proceeding,'6 and the granting of approval validates "the whole of the
contract and all of its terms and conditions." 7 Practitioners generally
seek to include in such orders language stating that the court has
determined the approval of the contract to be "in the best interests of
the minor." A judicial order approving a minor's contract under these
provisions must require' 8 that fifteen percent of the minor's gross
respect to an interest in real property, and (c) contracting with respect to personal
property not in the possession or control of the minor.
7. CAL. FAM. CODE § 6710.
8. Id. § 6712.
9. Id. § 6750.
10. Id. § 6751(a).
11. Id. §§ 6750-6753.
12. CAL. FAM. CODE § 6750 (a)(1).
13. CAL. FAM. CODE § 6751(a) provides that binding judicial approval can only be
granted by the superior court "in any county in which the minor resides or is employed or
in which any party to the contract has its principal office in [California] for the transaction
of business."
14. Id. § 6751(b).
15. Id. § 6752.
16. Id. § 6751(b).
17. CAL. FAM. CODE § 6751(c).
18. Id. § 6752(b)(1).
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earnings (a term which is also defined in the statute 9 ) be placed into a
trust account (referred to as a Coogan Trust Acz'ount), with one
parent or guardian being named as trustee (though the court does
have the power to determine that someone other than the
parent/guardian should be named "in the best interests of the
child").2' Deposit of the prescribed amount into the trust account
absolves the employer of any further liability for the funds.22 Funds
may be withdrawn by the minor upon reaching the age of eighteen.23
The trust account provisions of the California statute are quite
detailed, going so far as to identify the various types of institutions at
which trust accounts must be opened, 24 investments into which trust
funds may be invested,25 and the handling of unclaimed funds.26
B. New York
Legislation in the State of New York erects a legal framework
which is broadly similar to the situation in California, though it differs
in several significant respects. The New York General Obligations
Law confirms that minors are entitled to disaffirm contracts entered
into prior to the age of majority.27 The provisions dealing specifically
with minor performers begin by twinning labor and contractual
requirements: it is illegal (a misdemeanor) to employ a child
performer unless a child performer permit has been obtained in
accordance with New York labor laws.28 The New York Arts and
Cultural Affairs Law provides a statutory framework for judicial
sanctioning of entertainment industry contracts for the services of
minors: 29 assuming that a producer has complied with labor code
requirements, judicial approval of a minor performer contract can be
obtained, such approval obviating the right of the minor to disaffirm

19. Id. § 6750(c)(1).
20. Id. § 6753(a).
21.
22.

Id. § 6752(b)(2).
Id. § 6752(b)(6).

23.

CAL. FAM. CODE

24.
25.

Id. § 6753(a).
Id. § 6753(e)(3).

§ 6753(b).

26. See generally CAL. FAM. CODE § 6752.
27. N.Y. Gen. Oblig. Law § 3-101 states that "[a] contract made on or after
September first, nineteen hundred seventy-four by a person after he has attained the age
of eighteen years may not be disaffirmed by him on the ground of infancy," indicating that
a contract entered into by a person who has not attained eighteen years of age can be
disaffirmed by that person.
28. See N.Y. Arts & Cult. Aff. Law § 35.01 and N.Y. Lab. Law § 151.
29. Id.
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the contract on the ground of infancy or assert that the parent or
guardian lacked authority to make the contract. ° It should be noted
that though court approval will prevent the minor from disaffirming
the contract on the basis of infancy, a remedial device is present in the
statute which allows the minor or his or her parent/guardian to ask
the court to revoke its approval of the contract on the basis that "the
well-being of the infant is being impaired by the performance" of the
contract.3
The New York legislative framework focuses more on
procedural requirements than substantive ones. The only substantive
restriction on entertainment contracts for minors is that the term of
service may not exceed three years (or seven years if the minor is
"represented by qualified counsel experienced with entertainment
industry law and practices").32 The provisions relating to procedural
matters are more detailed than those set out in the California statute
with respect to such matters as venue, 33 required parties to the
proceeding' and materials to be filed with the application. 3 The
statute provides that the court may withhold approval of a performer
contract until the filing of a consent by the person entitled to the
earnings of the minor (typically the parent or guardian). 6 The statute
also provides that part of the net earnings of the minor be set aside
and saved for the benefit of the minor,37 and that the court shall fix
either the amount or the proportion to be set aside.8 The statute does
not stipulate the percentage of the minor's earnings that must be set
aside, though that percentage may not exceed 50%. 39 In determining
such amount or proportion, the court is directed to consider "the
financial circumstances of the parent or parents entitled to the
earnings of the infant and to the needs of their other children, or if
the infant is entitled to his own earnings and is married, to the needs
of his family., 4' However, the Estates, Powers and Trusts Law
requires (a) the parent or guardian of a child performer to establish a
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
6751(b).
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id. § 35.03(1).
Id. § 35.03(2)(e).
Id. § 35.03(2)(d).
Id. § 35.03(1); compare CAL. FAM. CODE § 6751(a).
N.Y. Arts & Cult. Aff. Law § 35.03(4)(a)-(b); compare CAL. FAM. CODE §
Id. § 35.03(5).
Id. § 35.03(3)(b).
Id. § 35.03(3)(a).
Id. § 35.03(3)(b).
Id. § 35.03(3)(b).
N.Y. Arts & Cult. Aff. Law § 35.03(3)(b).
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trust account in favor of the minor, and (b) that any employer of a
child performer pay 15% of the child's gross earnings into the
account.4 1 In practice, then, both the parent/guardian and employer of
a minor will be under legal compulsion to establish the trust account
even absent the court order.
Unlike the California statutes, the New York provisions also
speak to the liability of a parent or guardian who either is a party to
the contract or "guarantees" the performance of the minor pursuant
to the contract: only if the contract has been approved by the court
pursuant to the procedure outlined above will the parent or guardian
be liable to the producer for either a refusal on the part of the minor
to perform or a purported disaffirmance of the agreement. 2
The mechanisms described by the California Family Code and
the New York Arts and Cultural Affairs Law enable producers
carrying on business in those jurisdictions to contract with minors
with a significant degree of certainty, assuming that they abide by the
procedural and substantive obligations imposed by the legislative
framework. Producers who undertake film activities in Canada face
different challenges, particularly in the common law jurisdiction of
Ontario.
III. Canada
A. Ontario
1. Overview
It is beyond the scope of this paper to provide a full delineation
of Canadian common law as regards contracting with minors. Readers
seeking the most comprehensive treatments of the topic are
encouraged to refer to the Percy paper noted above,43 or "Restitution
of Benefits Conferred Under Minor's Contracts" by John D.
McCamus.' The focus of this article, arising from its practical
significance for producers, is on the formulation of cogent arguments
which can be advanced in an attempt to overcome the uncertainties of
the case law and allow producers to obtain an enforceable agreement
pursuant to which they obtain the rights necessary to enable them to

41. N.Y. Est., Powers & Trusts Law § 7-7.1.
42. N.Y. Gen. Oblig. Law § 3-107.
43. Percy, supra note 1 at 1.
44. John D. McCamus, Restitution of Benefits Conferred Under Minor's Contracts,28
U. New Brunswick L.J. 89 (1979).
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produce and exploit their production. For purposes of this discussion,
a brief overview of the current common law position, to the extent it
can be summarized, is provided. Relevant statutes in Ontario which
have modified the common law include the Age of Majority and
Accountability Act (Ontario)," which sets the age of majority in
Ontario at eighteen years, and section 7 of the Statute of Frauds,
which stipulates that the ratification (i.e., after reaching the age of
majority) of a contract entered into during minority must be made in
writing. 6 The focus on the ability of producers to rely on the
enforceability of a minor's contract warrants special attention to two
cases, Chaplin v. Leslie Frewin (Publishers) Ltd. and Toronto
Malboro Major Junior "A" Hockey Club v. Tonelli, which are of
particular significance 7
In reviewing the commentary on the relevant Canadian case law,
one is repeatedly struck by the frustration expressed by those who
have undertaken to provide a cogent description of the current
situation. As noted by Maddaugh and McCamus, "many observers
have taken the view that the law in this area is beyond judicial repair
and that a sound restatement of the law can be effected only by
legislative enactment., 48 Writing thirty years ago, Percy opined that
the law in this area is "extremely uncertain, even on basic
questions... The rules which can be discerned often create arbitrary
and rather irrational distinctions. . . [which] often bear little
relationship to present day realities. 4 ' That being said, it is possible
to fashion a plausible argument rooted in existing case law that
addresses the particular concerns of a producer contracting for
intellectual property rights related to exploitation of a minor's
performance.
Canadian courts have recognized that an unrestricted power
vested in minors to avoid contracts could undermine the original
policy of protecting the interests of minors; people would be
extremely reluctant to contract with or engage minors if all contracts
purportedly entered into by a minor could be rendered unenforceable
at the whim of the minor. Minors have an interest in being able to
securely obtain certain types of goods (such as food), services (such as
45. Age of Majority and Accountability Act (Ontario), R.S.O., ch. A-7, § 1 (1990).
46. Statute of Frauds (Ontario), R.S.O., ch. S-19 (1990).
47. See Chaplin v. Leslie Frewin (Publishers) Ltd., [1966] Ch. 71;
Toronto Malboro Major Junior "A" Hockey Club v. Tonelli, [1979] 23 O.R.2d.
48. PETER D. MADDAUGH & JOHN D. MCCAMUS, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION, 14-

27 (2005).
49. Percy, supra note 1, at 55.
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hygiene or education), and monetary remuneration in exchange for
the rendering of their own services. Persons in a position to satisfy
such interests seek certainty in contracting with minors for their
provision. In seeking to reconcile the competing interests of
protecting minors from exploitation (arising from their relatively
weak situation compared to most counterparties) while also reserving
certain species of contracts or relationships in order to ensure that the
valid interests of minors (to obtain beneficial goods and services) are
protected, a body of case law has arisen which is sometimes less than
lucid if reviewed with the hope of finding predictability. Minors can,
of course, enforce against the adult party any contract they enter
into.5 °
David R. Percy, in surveying Canadian common law, concluded
that "infants' contracts" could be sorted into four categories: binding
contracts, voidable contracts (itself divisible into contracts which are
binding until repudiated and contracts which are not binding until
ratified), and void contracts." Though the boundaries between these
categories are not always impermeable, and though the judicial
reasoning does not always maintain the necessary rigor in maintaining
this analytical framework, the categories do provide a useful
mechanism with which to approach the problem of contracting with
minors, and can serve to simplify the inquiry.
Void Contracts
Though courts have tended to elide the difference between
"void" and "voidable," it is imperative to maintain the distinction: a
void contract is a nullity ab initio and cannot be ratified by the minor
upon reaching majority. This has a significant impact on the nature of
recovery to which the minor is entitled: he "may recover back money
paid or property transferred regardless of any benefits he has
received and of his ability to make restitution to the other party."52
The draconian nature of this right to recovery has resulted in the
category of absolutely void contracts being largely abandoned in the
United States. Though a comprehensive list of the types of contracts
which will be deemed void does not exist, Percy argues that the
category should be construed as narrowly as possible, and limited to

50. Rex v. Rash, [1923] 41 C.C.C. 215,225.
51. Percy, supra note 1, at 2FF.
52. Percy, supra note 1, at n.148 and accompanying text.
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those contracts which contain a penalty or clear prejudice to the
minor."
Voidable Contracts
As Percy described in detail, the origins of the traditional
distinction between contracts binding until repudiated and contracts
not binding until ratified was obscure.' Even thirty years ago, Percy
described the distinction as "arguably irrational," and he concluded
that some Canadian courts were inclined to ignore the distinction and
simply treat all minors' contracts (except those for necessaries,
discussed below) as binding until repudiated.5
i.

Contracts Which Are Binding Until Repudiated By The Minor

Historically only four types of contracts fell into this category:
contracts concerning land, contracts for the purchase of shares,
partnership agreements, and marriage settlements.
ii. Contracts Which Are Not Binding Until Ratified By The Minor
At common law, all contracts to Which a minor was party
(excluding the four types described in the preceding paragraph,
contracts for necessaries and services, and those so prejudicial as to
be void), were not binding on the minor until ratified by the minor
upon achieving the age of majority.
Binding Contracts
The common law doctrine providing that contracts for
"necessaries" are enforceable against a minor56 has been codified in
Ontario law as section 3 of the Sale of Goods Act: 7 "where
necessaries are sold and delivered to a minor... he or she shall pay a
reasonable price therefor." What constitutes "necessaries" has been
the subject of diverse opinion; it clearly includes necessary food,
clothing and medicine,58 and can include matters such as the provision
of legal services.5 9 Even a contract for necessaries, however, must be

53. Percy, supra note 1, at Part D.1.
54. Id. at 14-32.
55. Id. at 15.
56. See, e.g., Wharton v. Mackenzie, 5 Q.B. 606, 606-614 (1844); Roberts v. Gray, 1
K.B. 520 (1913).
57. Sale of Goods Act, R.S.O., ch. S-1, § 3(1) (1990).
58. See CHITTY ON CONTRACTS, para. 8-008 (H.G. Beale ed., 29h ed., vol. 1, Sweet &
Maxwell 2004) (1826).
59. Id. para. 8-013.
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beneficial for the minor, and will not be binding on the minor party if
it contains oppressive terms.' A complementary category of
enforceable contracts are beneficial contracts of apprenticeship,
service, education and livelihood.61 As alluded to above, the rationale
for enforcing such contracts is to ensure that minors are not deprived
of any potential advantage which may accrue from this type of
relationship. Sometimes colloquially referred to as "contracts for
service," these are contracts which "permit [the minor] to earn his
livelihood or to be trained for some trade or profession."6 2 A contract
for service may be held to be enforceable so long as the minor is
receiving some advantage from the transaction equal to or in excess
of any rights or interests which are being foregone. 63 There has,
perhaps inevitably, been some "bleeding" of the latter category:
the principle that contracts beneficial to a minor are binding on him
is not confined to contracts for necessaries and contracts of
employment, apprenticeship or education in a strict sense. It
extends also to other contracts which in a broad sense may be
treated as analogous to contracts of service, apprenticeship or
education.6 (emphasis added)

Examples of contracts held to be enforceable against the minor under
this rubric include a contract between a minor and a publisher to
publish the ghost-written biography of.the minor, 6 a
management
agreement between a management company and a musical group.66
This extension of enforceability should not be over-stated. However,
there remains no general principle that simply because a contract is
beneficial to a minor it will be held to be enforceable. Rather, the
extent to which a contract can favorably be compared to a contract
for necessaries or a contract for services will likely be determinative.
2.

Constructing the Argument

Based on the foregoing, the beginnings of an argument for the
enforceability of a performer's contract with a minor can be
formulated: a performer contract can be described as, if not a contract
for services, at least analogous thereto. As described above, the
performer contract is essentially an employment contract, offering
payment in exchange for services rendered. Given the realities of the
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id. para. 8-009. See also Fawcett v. Smethurst, 84 LJKB 473 (1914).
CHITTY, supra note 57, paras. 8-021.
Percy, supra note 1, at 9.
Clements v. London & North Western Ry Co., 2 Q.B. 482 (1894).
CHITrY, supra note 587, para. 8-028.
Chaplin v. Leslie Frewin (Publishers) Ltd., Ch. 71 (1966).
Denmark Prods, Ltd. v. Boscobel Prods, Ltd. 1 Q.B. 699 (1969).
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entertainment industry, the engagement of a minor performer is one
of the few feasible avenues for an actor to prepare for a career in the
industry. Categorization as a contract for necessaries or services will
not be conclusive. However, it must still be found to be beneficial to
the minor in order to be held enforceable by the courts.
There are also some developments in relation to the remedies
available upon a purported repudiation by the minor which may be of
assistance to producers. In addressing the rights of recovery of the
parties to a contract with a minor, Maddaugh and McCamus write
that there are Canadian authorities who address the uncertainties of
the rights of a supplier of non-necessaries
which suggest a jurisdiction to require the minor who wishes to
avoid the agreement to make restitutio in integrum to the other
party-provided that this jurisdiction need not be67exercised where
it would be inequitable [i.e., to the minor] to do so.
Articulated another way, "Canadian courts. . . have moved
toward acceptance of the general principle that the minor is entitled
to restitution, provided that the minor makes restitution to the other
party" [emphasis added]. 6' The ability of the minor to effect
restitution, in other words, can limit the ability of a minor to
repudiate a contract.
In the comparatively sparse collection of Canadian case law on
contracts with minors, there do not appear to be any reported
decisions which involve performer contracts. Producers are forced,
then, to turn to authoritative cases which address scenarios similar to
the underlying elements of an actor agreement, mainly the
engagement of a minor to provide his or her services. Such services
are based on an inherent talent possessed by the minor for some type
of performance, and the concomitant transfer of intellectual property
rights from the minor to the counter-party. Two cases in particular
recommend themselves to this task: Tonelli,69 an Ontario Court of
Appeal decision; and Chaplin,7 a decision of the English Court of
Appeal. 7' The former provides the controlling analysis under Ontario
law for the enforceability of a minor's contract,72 while the latter
67.
68.
69.

MADDAUGH & MCCAMUS, supra note 48, at 14-29. See n. 116 for authorities.
MADDAUGH & MCCAMUS, supra note 48, at 14-28.

Tonelli, 23 O.R.2d.

70. Chaplin, [1966] Ch. 71.

71. While English court decisions are not binding authority on Canadian courts,
decisions of the English Court of Appeal and the House of Lords are afforded
considerable respect and consideration; see generally THE CANADIAN ABRIDGMENT, 3d
ed. (Thomson 2005) vol. 61, para. XVIII.5.c.1 and ff.
72. Tonelli, 23 O.R.2d.
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addresses the ability of a minor to effect restitution in the case of a
transfer of intellectual property rights. 3
(a) Tonelli
The 1979 Ontario Court of Appeal decision in Toronto Malboro
Major Junior "A" Hockey Club v. Tonelli offers the most recent
appellate court consideration in Ontario of contracting with minors,
and sets forth the current analytical framework. 4 At the age of
seventeen, John Tonelli entered into a contract with the plaintiff
junior hockey club, referred to as the Marlboros.75 The contract
contained stipulations which required Tonelli to play exclusively for
the team for three years (extendable to four at the plaintiff's sole
discretion) and, were he ever to play for a professional hockey team,
to remit twenty percent of his gross earnings to the plaintiffs during
the first three years of his professional career.76 The day after he
turned eighteen, Tonelli repudiated the contract with the Marlboros
and signed an agreement with the Houston Aeros of the professional
World Hockey Association.7 The Marlboros commenced an action
for breach of contract, arguing that that the agreement was
enforceable against Tonelli.78 The Court of Appeal concluded that the
contract was not enforceable against Tonelli, due to the contract not
being for his benefit.79
The reasons for the decision written by Justice Blair (with Justice
Arnup concurring), described the fundamental question facing the
court as "whether the contract . . . was beneficial to [the minor]."'
The majority reiterated that the onus of proving the contract to be to
the minor's benefit lay with the plaintiffs (i.e., the party seeking to
enforce the contract against the minor).8 l In setting forth the
fundamental principles of contracting with a minor (enunciating
principles of law so "well established [that] no authority need be cited
to support them"), Blair made clear that the contract could not "be
invalidated simply because it places some burdens upon an infant."'

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Chaplin, [1966] Ch. 71.
Tonelli, 23 OR.2d.
Id. at 193.
Id. at 197-198.
Id. at 199.
Id.
Id. at 193.
Tonelli, 23 O.R.2d. at 204.
Id. at 193.
Id. at 207.
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Rather, a nuanced assessment of the question of benefit was required.
Though the reasoning includes the statement that the court was
obliged to "construe the contract as a whole and strike a balance
between its beneficial and onerous features,"83 it is perhaps more
accurate to describe the court's role as assessing the beneficial and
onerous features of the contract with the goal of measuring the
balance between beneficial and onerous aspects - where the negative
aspects outweighed the beneficial, the contract would not be held to
be enforceable against the minor.
Blair's reasoning takes pains to emphasize that the inquiry into
whether the contract is "beneficial" is much broader than a simple
assessment of pecuniary benefit (which would also encompass an
assessment of opportunity cost). ' It is not even clear from the
reasoning that pecuniary matters are of overriding concern. In this
particular case the economic aspects of the agreement were of
"paramount" but not determinative importance; Blair undertook a
survey of the non-pecuniary aspects of the agreement because it was,
in his view, possible that the negative economic aspects could be
"counterbalanced by other factors."8 5 Those other factors included
"less tangible considerations" such as whether it was in Tonelli's longterm interests to accept onerous conditions in exchange for an
opportunity to access the more lucrative world of professional
hockey." Because the junior hockey leagues were virtually the only
mechanism by which a promising player, and given the financial
realities of the hockey industry, went the plaintiff's argument,87
Tonelli was being offered the best possible deal, all things considered.
The majority had no trouble concluding that the Marlboros
contract contained "obvious economic disadvantages" ' for Tonelli:
the salary paid to Tonelli was described by Blair as "a pittance,"8 9 and
was expressly contrasted with the salary he could have been earning
as a professional player if he had not been tied to the junior team.
The requirement that Tonelli pay a fifth of his gross earnings to the
team for a period of three years after he had left their employ was, if
anything, an afterthought in light of what the court felt was the most
offensive aspect of the contract: that the three- (and possibly four-)
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id.
See id. at 207-08.
Id. at 208.
Tonelli, 23 O.R.2d. at 210.
Id. at 206.
Id. at 208.
Id. at 209.
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year term of the agreement "prevented him from capitalizing fully on
his ability as a player" during that timei' Tonelli would lose the
opportunity to play in a professional league, which would have
enabled him to burnish his reputation, improve his skills and make
better money. In short, "the loss of three years of valuable time in a
major league would ... be irreplaceable."9'
The court rejected the plaintiff's arguments that any immediate
economic unfairness was the acceptable quid for the quo of being
allowed possible entrance into the world of professional hockey.' It
was not, Blair noted, an issue "whether Tonelli's contract was
necessary for the preservation of the League or the Marlboros. 93 At
this point, the inquiry could reasonably have been concluded: the
pecuniary benefits were, relatively speaking, negligible, and could not
be outweighed by any non-pecuniary benefits which might be said to
accrue under the agreement. Regrettably, the court's reasoning
continued into a brief discussion of contracts of adhesion,
unconscionability and agreements in restraint of trade. Though the
analysis on these additional theories of unenforceability also militated
in favour of Tonelli, it should be made clear that they are not
traditional elements of the contracting with a minor analysis (though
unconscionability may share an originary impetus, namely the
protection of weaker parties), nor are they necessary for arriving at
the conclusions reached by the Tonelli decision. For reasons of
analytical and doctrinal clarity, adhesion, unconscionability and
restraint of trade should be pleaded and considered in the alternative,
not as adjuncts to the discrete question of whether a contract against
a minor is enforceable.
In contrast to the morass of case law and arcane distinctions
which Percy took such pains to attempt to make sense of, the brisk
clarity of the Tonelli reasoning offers a better analytical model and
way forward: simply assess whether the agreement is for the benefit
of the minor, and avoid the inevitable entanglement of trying to parse
the accumulated bramble of common law analyses which no longer
serve any rational purpose. In evaluating "benefit," the Tonelli
decision also makes it clear that the analysis is to be comprehensive:
rather than limiting itself to bare monetary concerns, a constellation

90.

Id.

91.
92.
93.

Id.
Tonelli, 23 O.R.2d. at 209.
Id. at 210.
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of concerns can be examined, including whether the contract can be
viewed as a component part of advancing the career of the minor.
(b) Chaplin
The 1966 English Court of Appeal decision in the case of
Chaplin v. Leslie Frewin (Publishers) is particularly apposite for
producers, since it is one of the only cases involving a minor which
addressed the issue of whether copyright could be transferred
pursuant to a contract with a minor.' The case involved a dissolute
son of Charlie Chaplin, who at the age of eighteen (twenty-one then
being the age of majority in England) entered into an agreement
whereby Chaplin's biography was to be ghost-written for the benefit
of the publishers; the contracts stipulated that Chaplin was to hold
copyright in the memoir as author thereof, and an exclusive license to
publish and sell the book was granted to the publishers. Within six
months of signing the contracts, Chaplin sought to repudiate them on
the basis of advice given to him that the negative picture painted by
the manuscript would be prejudicial to his interests.
It is important to note that all three appellate judges were of the
opinion that the contract could be binding on the minor Chaplin so
long as the publishers were able to*demonstrate that it was "on the
whole" for his benefit. Indeed, Lord Denning, though ultimately
dissenting from the majority decision and holding that the agreement
was unenforceable because enforcing it would have the effect of
"purveying scandalous information" about the minor (and thereby
not being to his benefit), described the contract as being "of a class
which would be binding on him... if it was on the whole for his
benefit." Denning acknowledged that "authors and composers often
start young" and that contracts of this type were "analogous to
contracts of service and are binding if they are for his benefit." The
category of contracts in question, presumably rooted in the rendering
of services by a minor which could be described as artistic or athletic,
can rationally be expanded to include all contracts whereby an
intrinsic aptitude of the minor is sought to be exploited by the
contracting party.
Reflecting the dynamic identified at the beginning of this paper,
the publishers, in seeking to enforce the contract, made two
alternative arguments: either the contract was enforceable since it was
analogous to a contract of service which itself was analogous to a
contract for necessaries, or, even if the contract was potentially
94. Chaplin v. Leslie Frewin (Publishers), Ltd. & Another, [1966] Ch. 71 (CA).
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voidable by Chaplin, the assignment of copyright contained in the
agreement was not revocable. In other words, even if a contract is
avoided by a minor, any property and interests, including copyright,
previously transferred cannot be recovered. Two of the three
appellate judges concurred. As Danckwerts, L.J. stated,
[T]he transfers of property made by the plaintiff remain effective
against him, even if the contract is otherwise revocable. This, I
think, is the true effect of the authorities cited to us. .

.

. The

copyright is no longer at the plaintiff's disposal.
In assessing whether the contract was for the benefit of the
minor, the court was satisfied that it was sufficiently beneficial to be
enforceable because the contract "would enable the plaintiff to make
a start as an author and thus earn money." Entry to an otherwise
closed industry, coupled with the possibility of a reasonable amount
of remuneration for services rendered or rights granted, is sufficient
to render a contract enforceable. Chaplin's argument, that the
material contained in the book would be prejudicial to his interests
because it cast him in a negative light, was dismissed:
I find it difficult to sympathise with a person who, for the purpose
of gain, has approved of a book which is calculated to denigrate his
character and afterwards wishes to change his mind ....

The mud

may cling, but the profits will be secured.
It is worth emphasizing that the Chaplin decision held that the
copyright was not capable of restitution, and the book had not yet
even been published. Justice Danckwerts goes so far as to say that the
effect of the caselaw authorities is that transfers of copyright by a
minor "remain effective against [the minor], even if the contract is
otherwise revocable" (emphasis added). Justice Winn, concurring in
the reasoning of Danckwerts, reiterated that, because copyright had
vested in the publishers, the transfer of copyright "could not be
divested or avoided by any ... purported election on the part of the
infant." It is thus sufficient that copyright merely must have been
effectively transferred; where the transferred copyright has already
been exploited, the case for the impossibility of effecting restitution
of the copyright becomes even more compelling.
Though the Chaplin decision did not make it an express element
of their decision, perhaps the most compelling argument to limit the
ability of a minor to rescind any grant of intellectual property rights is
with reference to the principle that the minor's right to recover
property transferred (in effect, to rescind the grant of rights) should
be conditional on the minor's ability to effect restitutio in integrum to
the benefit of the other party. If the minor actor is unable to return
the producer to the position they occupied prior to the agreement
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having been effected by returning the money he or she was paid to
perform, then the grant of rights should not be capable of rescission.
Because of the realities of film financing, where a producer is often
obliged to grant rights to third party distributors even prior to
shooting the film's first frame (in exchange for a commitment to
provide funds necessary to finance the production), a producer must
often rely on the grant of rights contained in the performer
agreement. Also, simply returning the fee paid (i.e., in exchange for a
rescission of the rights granted) will not serve to ameliorate the
producer's loss: it will often be prohibitively expensive, if not
impossible, to re-shoot the scenes. Although Canadian law abstractly
recognizes that the impossibility of restitution acts as a limitation on
the ability of a minor to disaffirm a grant of property rights,95 there is
no authority directly on point. With respect to the intersection of this
issue and intellectual property rights, the Chaplin case appears to the
closest relative to binding authority.
(c) Summation
Based on the foregoing discussion, the elements with which to
argue for the enforceability of a minor's performer contract can be
ascertained. A fundamental requirement is that the agreement be for
the benefit of the minor. While fair monetary remuneration for the
services rendered would almost certainly be required, the contract
producers must also be careful to avoid provisions whose negative
impact could outweigh the pecuniary aspects. Overlong exclusivity
periods, onerous penalty clauses or failure to include an adequate
provision for ensuring that the working conditions of the minor are
acceptable could all prove fatal. As discussed below, a producer
should know that engaging the minor in accordance with the terms of
a collective bargaining agreement (such as the ACTRA Independent
Production Agreement) should be conclusive evidence that the
contract is for the benefit of the minor.
If a producer is confronted with a situation where the
enforceability of a minor's contract is called into question, his or her
counsel should frame their arguments so as to cast the agreement as
analogous to a contract for service. This would include pointing out
that the agreement is essentially an employment contract, should
include reference to the fact that the terms of the agreement are
95. See Sturgeon v. Starr, [1911] 17 W.L.R 402, 404 and Louden Mfg. Co. v. Milmine,
[1908] 15 O.L.R. 53, 54: "[I]t must be that if an infant avails himself of the right he has to
avoid a contract which he has entered into and upon the faith of which he obtained goods,
he is bound to restore the goods which he has in possession at the time he so repudiates."
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consistent with industry standard and should emphasize that by
entering into the agreement in question the minor is realizing on an
opportunity to work in the entertainment industry; in other words, if
the minor were not prepared to accept the terms of the contract
offered by the producer (assuming, of course, that such terms are fair
and for the benefit of the minor), the minor could run the risk of not
being able to exploit his or her talents in a potentially lucrative field.
In the worst case scenario, where a producer is unable to
convince a court that the contract was indeed for the benefit of the
minor and the contract is deemed to be unenforceable against the
minor, he should turn to the Chaplin decision as authority that a
conveyance of intellectual property cannot be rescinded by a minor.
As a further buttress against the potential loss of the intellectual
property rights, a producer can attempt to rely on the authorities,
noted above, which indicate an equitable jurisdiction in the courts to
bar a minor from recovering (i.e., being granted a rescission of the
grant of his or her intellectual property rights) unless the minor can
effect restitution to the producer. Because the producer will have
expended time, money and opportunity in reliance on the grant of
rights, it will likely be insufficient for the minor to simply refund the
money. Where the production is already in the process of being
exploited, it is difficult to imagine how a minor can restore the
producer to his or her pre-contractual position. That incapacity
should be a bar to the minor seeking to repudiate the contract.
B.

British Columbia

1. Statute and Regulations
The Province of British Columbia, a major film and television
production center within Canada, has, in an approach similar to that
found in California and New York but unique amongst Canadian
provinces, codified the handling of contracts with minors. Section
19(1) of the Infants Act provides that a contract entered into by a
minor is unenforceable against the minor, unless (a) otherwise
specifically provided by statute, (b) affirmed by the minor upon

reaching the age of majority, (c) performed or partially performed by
the minor within one year after attaining the age of majority, or (d)
not repudiated by the minor within one year after attaining the age of
majority.96 Section 9 of the British Columbia Employment Standards

96.

R.S.B.C., ch. 223 (1996).
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Act97 provides that a minor under twelve years of age cannot be
employed without the permission of the Director of Employment
Standards, who also has authority to set the conditions of
employment for each such minor; the Employment Standards Act
regulations governing the employment of minors in the province are
incorporated into the collective agreement of the Union of B.C.
Performers.98
The Infants Act provides two routes in obtaining a binding
contract with a minor, though in practice the two routes merge into
one procedure. The first option is to make an application to the court,
on behalf of the infant (which requires the permission of the parent or
guardian of the minor), seeking an order granting the minor capacity
to enter into a specific contract." The second option is to make an
application to the Public Guardian and Trustee of British Columbia
(the "PGT");' °° the PGT is empowered to make an order granting
contractual capacity or ratify a contract already entered into if the
PGT determines that "the making of such an order would be in the
best interests of the [child].'' °. The granting of an order by either the
court or the PGT obviates the effect of section 19(1) of the Infants
Act, thus rendering the contract which is the subject of the order
enforceable against the minor (and removing the ability of the minor
to repudiate the agreement). 2 The practical merger of the two
options occurs because any application to the court must also be
copied on the PGT, 3 which triggers a review process undertaken by
the PGT.'
In assessing whether to grant an order applied for under section
21(1), the court must be satisfied that the order "is for the benefit of
the infant and that, having regard to the circumstances of the infant,
he or she is not in need of the protection offered by law to infants in
matters relating to contracts."' 0'5 The PGT, in reviewing an application

97. R.S.B.C. 1996, ch. 113 (1996), as amended.
98. See Section C (ACTRA/UBCP), below.
99. Infants Act, R.S.B.B., ch. 223, § 21(1) (1996). An order may also be sought which
grants the minor "full capacity" (or "emancipation" in the American argot), or capacity to
enter into a "class" of contracts.
100. Id. § 22(1).
101. Id.
102. See Infants Act, ch. 223, § 21(3) for court orders and s. 22(3) for PGT orders.
103. Infants Act, ch. 223, § 21(4).
104. See
Public
Guardian
and
Trustee
of
British
Columbia,
http://www.trustee.bc.ca/services/youth/protectiveservices.html
(last visited Oct. 15,
2006).
105. Infants Act, ch. 223, § 21(2).
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for an order, is directed to undertake a more fulsome review in which
it must consider: "(a) the nature, subject matter, and terms of the
contract; (b) the requirements of the minor, having regard to his or
her particular circumstances; (c) the age and means of the minor; and
(e) the wishes of the minor's parent or guardian."' Although not
statutorily required to do so, the identical review is undertaken by the
PGT when it is provided notice of an application for an order which
has been made to the court.1 °7
There are no statutory requirements compelling the court or the
PGT to include particular substantive requirements in an order.
However, British Columbia labor law regulations stipulate that with
respect to any minor under fifteen years of age 0 8 (but not minors aged
between fifteen and eighteen) who is employed in the film industry
and who earns more than $2,000 on a production, the employer must
remit 25% of any earnings over $2,000 to the PGT to be held in trust
for the child. °9 In practice, most court orders obtained pursuant to the
provisions of the Infants Act provide for the imposition of some form
of trust for the benefit of the minor.
2. Hann-Byrd
Re Hann-Byrd, the only reported case on point, decided
pursuant to an earlier version of the provisions contained in the
Infants Act, is notable for two reasons: the criteria which the court
used in concluding that an order should be granted giving the minor
capacity to enter into the contract in question; and the substance of
the financial protection provisions which were included in the order.
10 Adam Hann-Byrd was a ten-year old film actor who was engaged
to appear in a film entitled "Digger." Adam's mother, as his guardian
ad litem, brought the application, though the court noted that the
application was "in reality being made by the producer of the film...
with the full approval of Adam's parents."
In brief written reasons, the court noted the following in
concluding that the contract was "for the benefit of the infant:" a
"handsome payment" in exchange for a relatively short period of

106. Id. § 22(2).
107. See
Public
Guardian
and
Trustee
of
British
Columbia,
http://www.trustee.bc.ca/services/youth/protectiveservices.html (last visited Oct. 15,
2006).
108. See Employment Standards Act, Employment Standards Regulation, BC Reg.
396/95, as amended, § 45.5(2).
109. Id. s. 45.14.
110.

Re Hann Byrd, [1992] 75 B.C.L.R. 2d 65.
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work, potential merchandising royalties, as well as potential residuals
from future exhibitions. Although the court noted certain "penalties"
contained in the contract (which were not otherwise described) which
would be imposed if Adam failed to perform his acting services, it was
also noted that "there is no rational way to confer the benefits...
without imposing.., certain obligations." The criteria which the
court examines are, in short, primarily pecuniary in nature. The court
noted as well that Adam's parents were "obviously keen" to have the
contract approved, and that they trusted the producer of the film. In
characterizing the role played by the court in reviews of this type,
Fraser J. opined that the court's function was effectively to replace
the need for Adam to obtain independent legal advice by determining
whether the terms of the contract were for the minor's benefit.
The order issued by the Hann-Byrd court (which was issued, it
should be noted, prior to the enactment of the labour law regulations
referred to above) is instructive. It stipulates that payments made by
the producer to Adam be treated in a manner identical to that set out
in a previous order applicable to Adam made by the Superior Court
of California, i.e., deposited into a blocked account set up in
accordance with the California provisions described in Section II. A.
of this article. Precedent therefore exists for Canadian courts
approving the substantive mechanics for protecting minors as
required under California law. In other words, an arrangement
similar to the "Coogan Account" system familiar to US producers is
likely to be acceptable under at least British Columbian law.
C. ACTRAIUBCP
Producers who wish to engage performers who are members of
the Alliance of Canadian Cinema, Television and Radio Artists
("ACTRA") are required to become signatories to either the
Independent Production Agreement (the "IPA") (which establishes
minimum terms and conditions of engagement for performers in the
film, television and radio industry) or the National Commercial
Agreement (the "NCA") (which serves a similar function for
commercials), by means of signing a voluntary recognition agreement
or submitting an "intent to produce" notification, respectively.' In
the Province of British Columbia, the Union of B.C. Performers
111. See THE ALLIANCE OF CANADIAN CINEMA, TELEVISION AND RADIO ARTISTS
("ACTRA" ) ET AL., INDEPENDENT PRODUCTION AGREEMENT (2004), Appendix 3
[hereinafter ACTRA]; JOINT BROADCAST COMMITEE OF THE INSTITUTE PF
COMMUNICATIONS AND ADVERTISING, ET AL., NATIONAL COMMERCIAL AGREEMENT

Appendix "C" [hereinafter NCA].
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("UBCP") is a branch of ACTRA and is the exclusive bargaining
agent for performers in film and television productions within the
province; producers who wish to engage ACTRA/UBCP members
are required to become signatory to the B.C. Master Production
Agreement (the "BCMPA")."2
Producers who engage minors under the auspices of the IPA, the
NCA, or the BCMPA are contractually required to observe certain
requirements for the protection of minors specifically negotiated into
each collective agreement. 1 3 Pursuant to the ACTRA IPA, the
primary income protection mechanism is the establishment of a trust
for the benefit of the minor performer, into which 25% of earnings in
excess of Cdn $5,000 lifetime earnings are deposited."' The trust is
then administered by the ACTRA Performers' Rights Society
("PRS"), with the parent(s) or guardian(s) of the minor performer
choosing amongst three investment options."5 While the ACTRA
PRS has acknowledged that the protection mechanism is "to some
extent based upon" the British Columbia provisions, they expressly
take the position that "ACTRA knows it can do a better job than
Governments even if Provincial legislatures had the will to enact laws
to protect Minor's earnings." 6 ACTRA is closer and more
accountable to its members and understands their needs."" 7 The
BCMPA incorporates as Appendix "F" the British Columbia
Employment Standards Act regulations governing the employment of
minors; the provisions require that 25% of a minor's earnings in
excess of Cdn$5,000 lifetime earnings be deposited either with the
Public Guardian and Trustee of British Columbia in trust for the
minor, or, if approved by the Public Guardian and Trustee, into a
trust established for the benefit of the minor or a court-approved
account established for the benefit of the minor."'
Neither the ACTRA IPA, the NCA, nor the BCMPA
expressly address the concerns discussed in this article about the
enforceability of a minor's contract. There are no reported cases
112. B.C. Master Production Agreement, Article A101.
113. The defined term "minors" refers to "Performers under the age of 18 years." See
ACTRA, Article A2701.
114. See ACTRA, Article A2716; NCA, Article 1611.
115. The options include two separate types of mutual fund and a Registered
Education Savings Plan (RESP), each of which is managed by outside advisors.
116. ACTRA Website, http://www.actra.ca/actra/control/mt-faq (last visited on Sept.

20, 2005).
117. Id.
118. See B.C. Master Production Agreement, Appendix "F" - Part G; see also
R.S.B.C., ch. 113 (1996), as amended.
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dealing with an ACTRA or UBCP member minor who sought to
repudiate his or her contract and there does not appear to be a
mechanism which would enable a producer who has engaged an
ACTRA or UBCP member minor to seek relief directly against
ACTRA or the UBCP, as applicable. The fact that a minor performer
is an ACTRA or UBCP member and that their contract has been
entered into on terms which respect the minimums set forth in the
IPA or the BCMPA should, however, be used to buttress arguments
of the type advanced in this article. The fact that the minimum terms
of the agreement have been sanctioned by a collective agreement
should be prima facie evidence that the contract is for the benefit of
the minor. Certainly the requirement for monetary remuneration is
present, as well as the insurance that the best interests of the minor
are being addressed in terms of working conditions. Furthermore,
each of the ACTRA IPA and BCMPA ensures that there is an
entitlement to residuals, and that sophisticated advocacy and
grievance mechanisms are in place to protect the minor's interests.
D. Guarantees and Indemnities
As a practical matter most producers engaging a minor try to
obtain a guarantee or indemnity from the parent or guardian of the
child. There are, however, a number of potential pitfalls in this area
which require careful drafting in order to ensure that the goal of
being able to hold the parent liable is realized. Additionally, as will be
discussed below, it is questionable whether even a guarantee or
indemnity will provide sufficient assurances from a producer's point
of view. The critical element for the producer will be obtaining the
right to exploit the image and voice of the minor in the production.
Even if a parent can be held financially liable for the failure of the
infant to perform the contract, it is not clear that the producer's goal
of obtaining the necessary rights to exploit the production can be
realized via this mechanism.
The distinction between a guarantee and an indemnity should be
highlighted, as there are practical (and potentially dire) consequences
between the two. A "guarantee" is a promise whereby one person
undertakes to be responsible for the debt, default or miscarriage of
another; the guarantor promises to a third party that another party
(the "principal") will perform obligations owed to the third party, and
if the principal fails to do so, the guarantor will be liable for that
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failure. " 9 One immediate consequence of classifying an obligation as a
guarantee in Ontario is that the obligation must be evidenced in
writing (pursuant to the Statute of Frauds).'2 °
An indemnity, in contrast to a guarantee, may be defined as "an
obligation to compensate for loss or liability".1 2 ' Thus, while a

guarantee is predicated on the existence of an underlying obligation
and the failure to meet that obligation (by the principal), an
indemnity does not require a similar set of circumstances obtaining,
even though such an unmet obligation may be present. Indemnities

do not need to reduced to writing in order to be cognizable at law or
in equity. As commentators have noted, the distinction between
guarantees and indemnities "is far from airtight, '1 22 but an example
using a child performer contract may serve to illustrate the difference.
Assume the scenario where a producer filming a feature film in
Ontario has entered into a distribution contract whereby the
producer promises to deliver a film on or before a certain date, which
date happens to be just before an important film market overseas.
The distributor, in turn, undertakes marketing and promotion
expenses in relation to the film in the expectation that the film will
form a central component of its sales efforts for overseas territories at
the market. The producer, meanwhile, engages a fourteen year-old
performer to perform a significant role in the film; aware of the
potential uncertainties relating to engaging minors, the producer's
lawyer adds additional language to the contract and requires the
mother of the child to sign the contract. Presume the child is
scheduled to render services for fifteen days, a major component of
the twenty-day shoot for the film. The child shows up, but on the fifth
day adamantly refuses to perform any further services. The producer
is stymied: at best, she will need to re-cast the part and re-shoot the
five days already completed. In any event, she has incurred significant
costs to date and will miss her delivery date to the distributor, who in
turn will have nothing to sell at the market. If the language inserted
by the producer's lawyer regarding the mother's obligation is worded
as a guarantee, the mother's potential liability is much narrower:
being a contractual obligation, the extent of the mother's liability will

119. See Statute of Frauds (Ontario), § 4; see also KEVIN P. MCGUINNESS, THE LAW
OF GUARANTEE (2d ed.) (Scarborough: Carswell, 1996), paras. 3.7 and 3.12.
120. Statute of Frauds (Ontario), R.S.O. 1990, ch. S-19.
121. See McGUINNESS, supra note 119, para. 11.5; see generally Zurich Ins. Co. v.
Modern Marine Indus. Ltd. (1993), 111 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 181 (Nfld TD).
122. See McGUINNESS, supra note 119, para. 11.6.
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be a question of constructing the terms of the contract. 23' She may
only be liable for the standard measure of contractual damages: i.e.,
the amount required to put the producer in the position she would
have been in had the contract been performed-in other words, the
amount necessary to identify and engage a replacement performer. If
the language was worded so as to include an indemnification concept,
however, the mother may well be liable to indemnify the producer for
losses incurred by the producer as a result of the distributor bringing
claims against the producer for failure to deliver the film on time,
because the nature of an indemnity
may lie not just in contract, but in
1 24
equity and even restitution.
There are three significant shortcomings with relying on the
assurances of third .party (i.e., a parent or guardian) as a mechanism
for protecting a producer's interests. First, while an indemnity would,
as described above, be preferable because it addresses a wider
spectrum of circumstances and potential liability, in many cases the
ability of a parent to satisfy any judgment is likely to be modest.
There is something to be said for the persuasive aspects of having a
potential lawsuit in your quiver, so to speak, but if a parent or child is
adamant about repudiating the contract or not rendering the services,
or if the parent and child have few assets, moral suasion may offer
only cold comfort.
A second potential defect with the guarantee as a device to
protect the producer is that a guarantee may not be enforceable. In
general, for a guarantee to be enforceable, the primary obligation
which is being guaranteed must itself be enforceable.'25 However, as
noted above, contracts with minors may not be enforceable against
the minor, due to lack of capacity on the part of the minor and the
residual ability of the minor to disaffirm the agreement. Whether a
contract entered into with a minor can properly be the subject of a
guarantee by a third party (such as a parent) remains open debate
unless the jurisdiction in question has acted to answer the question by
means of legislation. In England, a statutory provision was required
to make clear that a guarantee of a minor's contract was not
unenforceable solely on the basis that the underlying obligation was
unenforceable against the minor.'2 6 No similar provision exists in
Ontario. Contrary to the position described above with respect to
123. Id. para. 6.14; see also Hoole Urban Dist. Council v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of
Maryland, [1916] 1 K.B. 25, aff'd [1916] 2 K.B. 568.
124.

See McGUINNNESS, supra note 119, para. 11.2.

125. Swan v. Bank of Scotland (1836), 6 Eng. Rep. 231 (H.L.).
126. Minors' Contracts Act, ch. 13. § 2 (Eng.).
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New York law,"' statutory provisions in British Columbia stipulate
that a guarantor or indemnitor of a contract with a minor remains
liable on such guarantee or indemnity even if the underlying contract
with the minor is unenforceable against the infant.'
The third, and most fundamental, deficiency in looking to a third
party to satisfy a minor's obligations is that there is no effective
transfer of the required intellectual property rights. The guarantor
does not own or have control over the intellectual property rights
which the producer seeks, and thus is unable to effect a transfer of
such rights from the minor to the producer. In other words, a
producer relying on a guarantee may be able to recover monetary
damages against the guarantor, but will be unable to obtain the
property rights which are sought. For that reason it is preferable to
find the contract enforceable or the transfer itself incapable of
rescission, using the Tonelli and Chaplin analyses, described above.
E.

Court Declarations

Producers (and their counsel) from jurisdictions outside Ontario
(or the other common law provinces which have not, unlike British
Columbia, enacted a statutory remedy addressing minor's contracts)
often express unease at the apparent inability to obtain judicial
approval of a minor's contract. While the foregoing sections have
sought to outline a way forward based on the caselaw, it may be the
case that the arguments outlined herein offer insufficient comfort.
One other potential mechanism is available, at least in Ontario,
though it appears unused thus far.
Ontario courts retain a residual authority to "make binding
declarations of right.' ' 129 It is therefore at least possible to make an
application seeking a declaration with respect to a minor's contract.
Although it would be tempting to strive to obtain a declaration that
the contract is enforceable against the minor, it is much more likely
that a court would be more amenable to a declaration that the
contract is in the minor's best interests. Such a declaration would
presumably have the effect of estopping the minor from attempting to
avoid the contract on the basis that it was prejudicial to his or her
interests. Because declaratory relief of this nature is not often sought
in Ontario, there is little judicial guidance on which to draw. It may
be the case that Ontario courts, presented with the fact that the

127.
128.
129.

N.Y. Gen. Oblig. Law § 3-107.
Infants Act, R.S.B.C., ch. 223, § 23 (1996).
Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O., ch. C. 43, § 97 (1990).
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British Columbia legislation is in place, may take the position that in
the absence of any such legislation in Ontario they have no
jurisdiction to provide such declaratory relief.
In the case of Nickerson v. Nickerson, a parent sought, in the
course of martial dissolution proceedings, a declaration that he had
not sexually abused his daughter. 3 " The court declined to make a
declaration on three bases: (1) the legislation in question (in that case,
the Divorce Act and the Children's Law Reform Act) did not
expressly allow a parent to seek a declaration of the type sought in
that case; (2) the declaratory order sought did not originate "from a
right arising under a contract, agreement or statute... I cannot find a
right upon which a declaratory order ... could be founded;" and (3)
because the declaration sought would be a judgment in rem and
would thus affect the rights of the child, it would be necessary for the
child to be a party to the application. ' Two of those three concerns
could be assuaged in an application brought by a producer for
declaratory relief, by making the minor (or the minor's guardian ad
litem) a party to the proceeding, and by presenting the court with the
contract. In such a situation, where the parties were eager to obtain
the declaration and the court could be satisfied that the terms of the
agreement were not prejudicial to the minor, there is no compelling
reason for the court to deny issuing the declaration. Indeed, the
commercial benefits to both parties (certainty for the producer, access
to remuneration for the minor) should be of precisely the type which
a court would want to facilitate by exercising its jurisdiction.
IV. Conclusion
This article has attempted to tackle two objectives, both within
the context of the entertainment industry: (1) a survey of the current
state of the law of minor's contracts in the four primary North
American common law jurisdictions in which film and television
production occurs, and (2) the tracing of the arguments and options
available to producers who are confronted by the lack of certainty
surrounding this issue in Ontario. It would not be rash to conclude
that the legislative arrangements put in place in California, New York
and British Columbia better serve the interests of producers and
minors by creating a mechanism for entering into binding contracts
with performers who have not reached the age of majority. The
somewhat labyrinthine nature of the arguments which are described
130.
131.

Nickerson v. Nickerson, [1991] 4 O.R.3d 447, 454.
Id. at 454-55.
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above in the Ontario context hopefully provides all the impetus
necessary to conclude that the entertainment industry and performers
in that province would be well-served by implementing a regime
similar to that in British Columbia.
That being said, dependent of course on the circumstances of the
particular case, producers should be relatively comfortable about
engaging minors in Ontario. Especially where the performer
agreement is entered into under the auspices of ACTRA, the
controlling analysis under Ontario law indicates that a reasonably fair
contract entered into with a minor performer will be deemed
enforceable against the minor. In the event that analysis provides
insufficient certainty, a number of remedial devices are available to
producers, including the Chaplin decision and the possibility of
obtaining a court declaration.
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